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Closer economic integration within regional and international spheres has been the course of action 
characterizing the last decades of contemporary history. International trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) have been among the fastest expanding economic activities around the world due 
to increasing removal of trade restrictions and deregulation of international capital markets. 
Nowadays, FDI leads the process of internationalization of productive activities, whose principal 
actors are Multinational Enterprises (MNEs). While undertaking direct investments in different 
countries of economic integrated areas like the EU or the NAFTA,
1 MNEs own plants in several 
locations, organizing their business on an international basis. 
As suggested by Horn and Wolinsky (1988a), MNEs may exploit this organizational structure 
strategically to avoid the creation of an encompassing union. In this context, a major concern for 
organized labor is that MNEs are able to obtain concessions in terms of wage demands from unions. 
Public opinion asks unions of taking care of national interest, preserving existing jobs and economic 
activities, and trying to promote further domestic employment. Consequently, an increasing number 
of unions has shown interest in coordinating their activities across boundaries to recover bargaining 
positions. Mainly in the EU, the ongoing process of economic integration seems to encourage trans-
national cooperation. The exchange of information on wage levels, working conditions, and 
employment policies in different countries, as well as some shared rules in collective bargaining, 
have been recently introduced in Europe. These initiatives mostly occur at the intersectoral level − 
e.g., since 1998 the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) yearly provides the “guideline 
for collective bargaining at the European level”.
2 While union coordination in trading sectors is 
relatively rare, the figures concerning trans-national agreements in industries characterized by the 
presence of large MNEs steadily increased in last years: from 92 in 2005 to 243 in 2007, two thirds 
of which related to European MNEs’ activities within the EU itself (ETUC, 2008).      
Despite its relevance, the analysis of incentives and scopes for union cooperation in a context of 
economic integration started only in recent times. Precisely, this work focuses on this subject. 
Surprisingly, cross-border wage coordination policies (the main form of union cooperation) has 
received attention in a limited number of theoretical works. For instance, Huizinga (1993), Naylor 
(1999), Straume (2002), and Strozzi (2007, 2008) consider this issue in an international trade 
framework. Huizinga (1993) allows for the integration of two distinct union-firm bargaining units 
into a unified market with two bargaining units; the effects of wage harmonization are briefly 
sketched. Instead, in a two-country duopoly model with homogeneous products and segmented 
markets Naylor (1999) shows that unions may find advantageous to establish an international 
agreement for some trade cost levels, colluding over a wage rate which induces an autarky regime 
as equilibrium. The works of Straume (2002) and Strozzi (2007, 2008) deeply analyze the scope for 
unions to adopt collusive behavior. They start from Naylor’s (1999) framework, and examine which 
conditions support collusion as equilibrium of an infinitely repeated game. In particular, Strozzi 
(2007, 2008) shows that the sustainability of trans-national implicit collusion depends both on the 
trade cost levels and the degree of substitutability among goods. If trade costs are relatively small, a 
reduction in trade barriers (the measure of increasing economic integration) makes tacit collusion 
more difficult to be sustained; product differentiation strengthen this effect. Instead, in the presence 
of sufficiently high trade costs, a decrease of their level do not influence the sustainability of union 
collusion, which turns out to be easier the less similar are goods. 
The labor market effects of transnational union coordination are also considered in Zhao (1998), 
and Borghijs and Du Caju (1999). These authors focus on international productive activities. Zhao 
(1998) builds up a two-county model with union-management efficient bargaining and integrated 
                                                 
1 For example, of all the flows of FDI into the EU, the EU itself originated its bulk: as for the period 2003-2006, the 
average of inward intra-EU FDI flows was 76% (see European Commission, 2008). 
2 See European Commission (2009) for a review on cross-border coordination activities concerning collective 
bargaining,. product markets to investigate the impact of foreign direct investments on wage and employment 
outcomes. The author’s conclusion is that if union cooperation takes place, unions’ bargaining 
power increases since their outside option in negotiations will improve. Borghijs and Du Caju 
(1999) analyze the prospects for union cooperation in a context of international production 
considering an integrated product market. The model has a basic set up: a single firm with two 
plants in different countries characterized by decreasing returns to scale technology in the only 
factor of production, labor. The authors show that, for coordination costs large enough, monopoly 
unions are better off competing in the labor market; so, unions moderate their wage demands. For 
transaction costs lower than a threshold value, wage coordination turns out to be an attractive 
option, leading to higher wages. A further decline in coordination costs reduces the collusive wage, 
but this remains higher than the wage under separate setting.  
“Frictions” in the economic integration process affect union collusion: trade costs in the intra-
industry trade literature; coordination costs in the labor markets. While Straume (2002) and Strozzi 
(2007, 2008) address the analysis to the effects of product market integration on union collusion in 
a standard reciprocal dumping model, this work complements the earlier theoretical contributions 
exploring the topic in the presence of MNEs operating in an integrated product market. As in 
Borghijs and Du Caju (1999), the focus is on the impact of labor market integration. In doing so, the 
present work further extends their analysis to the sustainability of union collusive behavior and the 
implications of coordinated wage demands for social welfare. A key result is that, contrary to 
conventional wisdom that union collusion is always detrimental, wage coordination may improve 
overall welfare. Despite the results cannot be directly compared with the received literature (due to 
differences in the reference frameworks), this paper may help to shed lights on the recent 
developments of unions’ collusive practices.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal model of international 
production in unionized countries, analyzing both the outcomes of a separate and a collusive wage 
setting. Section 3 investigates the sustainability of trans-national coordinated wage demands. 
Section 4 examines the welfare implications under the two different wage settings. Section 5 closes 
the paper.  
 
2 A model of international production in unionized countries  
 
This section develops a partial equilibrium model of international oligopoly whit unionized 
countries. It extends Borghijs and Du Caju (1999), adding one firm and introducing a degree of 
product differentiation.  
In economically integrated bloc, there are two countries, A and B. In each country, two firms, 
denoted 1 and 2, locate a plant. Firms act as Cournot competitors in the single integrated product 
market. There are some exogenous fix costs large enough such that neither the incumbent firms 
start-up a new production facility nor a potential entrant will enter into the industry: the market 
structure is blockaded. Each firm produces differentiated goods, denoted x when produced in A, 
and  y  in B. Labor is the only  factor of production, with decreasing returns to scale. By 
assumption, the labor supply is sufficiently large to avoid corner solutions. A union operates in each 
country, and the industry’s workforce is unionized. There may be trade. This is not of the intra-
industry type, given the integrated market hypothesis. When trade occurs, transportation costs equal 
zero. Thus, production may shift across plants, and then the goods are eventually exported without 
extra costs.  
The model is a two-stage game, solved by backward induction. In the first stage, rent-maximizing 
monopoly unions set wages. The analysis compares two different wage settings: 1) a separate wage setting, where unions fix wages at national level;
3 2) a transnational collusive agreement on wages 
by labor unions. In the second stage, firms compete in the product market in a Cournot fashion.  
Firms’ production functions are  iA i n x =  and  iB i n y = . The inverse demand function for each 
product is 
 
j i i cq q a p − − =      j i 1,2 j i ≠ = , ,                                                                                         (1) 
 
where  i i i y x q + =  is total production of the firm i, and  ) 1 , 1 (− ∈ c  is the degree of product 
differentiation. If  0 ) (> < c , goods are complements (substitutes). Following Singh and Vives 
(1984), this demand structure derives from the maximization problem of a representative consumer 







Uaq q c q q =− + ∑∑   j i 1,2 j i ≠ = , .                 (2) 
 
Firms’ profits are: 
 
2 2 ) ( i B i A i i i i y w x w y x p − − + = Π   1,2 i =                            (3) 
                                                                                        
where  A w  is the wage rate paid in A and  B w  is the wage rate paid in B, respectively. Union utilities 
in countries A and B are  
 
A A A n w ) ( ϖ − = Ω  ,   B B B n w ) ( ϖ − = Ω ,                               (4) 
 
respectively, where  A A A n n n 2 1 + =  is total employment in country A, and  B B B n n n 2 1 + =  is total 
employment in country B.  0 > ϖ  is common in both countries, and could be interpreted as a 
minimum wage fixed by national governments in observance to an EU directive, and hence 
exogenously given for unions.  
 
2.1 Stage 2: Cournot competition between firms  
 
In the second stage of the game, the firms compete à la Cournot in the product market. The profit 
maximization problem is  
 
2 2
, , ) )]( ( ) ( [( max max i B i A i i j j i i y x i y x y w x w y x y x c y x a
i i i i
− − + + − + − = Π         j i 1,2 j i ≠ = ,     (5) 
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The optimal allocation of production among the plants is, therefore,  
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3 Given the assumptions of this model, national and industry level wage settings are identical. Nonetheless, as remarked 
in the introduction, the greatest part of the trans-national union agreements occurs at industry the level.  As expected,  A B i i w w y x = : the marginal cost of production for firm i across the two countries 
are equal. Given total production, this represents the necessary condition so that total production 
cost is minimized (and hence profit maximized). Allocation of production directly implies the 
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for  1,2 i = ,  with   0 < ∂ ∂ A iA w n ,  0 > ∂ ∂ B iA w n ,  0 > ∂ ∂ A iB w n , 0 < ∂ ∂ B iB w n : employment 
levels in each plant depend negatively on the domestic wage and positively on the competing 
country’s  wage rate.   
 
2.2 Stage 1, Case 1: Separate wage setting by national unions  
 
In stage 1, unions set wages to maximize rents. The analysis starts with the case of separate wage 
settings: each national union establishes a wage for its industry, taking as given the wage rate in the 
other country. Given symmetry, let us consider union A’s problem. Given the labor demand in (6) 
and the utility function in (4), the union chooses  A w  such that  
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representing the union’s A reaction function. A similar result holds for union B. Solving the non- 
linear system the equilibrium wage rate is  
 
ϕ ϖ + = = = B A
S w w w   
 
where  γ ϖ ϕ = , and  c + + = 2 ϖ γ . Differentiation shows  0 > ∂ ∂ ϖ
S w  and  0 > ∂ ∂ c w
S  
(upper script stands for Separate): an increase in the minimum wage and a decrease in the degree of 
product differentiation imply an increase in the wage rate. Further substitutions lead to the 
employment levels at each plant, given by  [ ]




iA  for  1,2 i = .  
 
2.2 Stage 1, Case 2: Collusive wage setting between national unions  
 
Let us consider the case of collusive behavior by unions. In this model, collusion stands for unions 
to achieve an agreement over a common wage that maximizes their joint utility, namely the sum of 
their utilities (efficient union collusion). However, unions incur an exogenous transactional cost 
0 ≥ τ  to coordinate their activities and for the sharing of information. These costs may 
counterbalance collusive gains (Borghijs and Du Caju, 1999). A reduction in transaction costs for 
unions is the measure for describing an increase in the labor market integration. Unions now 
maximize the following utility function 
 
) )( ( max arg B A
C
w
C n n w w
C + − − = τ ϖ .                      (8) First-order conditions yield 
 
τ γ ϖ 2 + + = = = B A
C w w w         
 
with  0 > ∂ ∂ ϖ
C w  and  0 > ∂ ∂ c w
C  (upper script indicates Collusion). Further substitutions allow 
to evaluate the employment levels at each plant, given by  [ ]




iA , for  1,2 i = .  
 
2.3 Unions and wage coordination 
 
This section analyzes unions’ position respect to wage coordination. Making use of the above 
results, it can be checked that in equilibrium union collusion leads to higher wages and lower 
employment levels for every degree of product differentiation: that is,  0 > −
S C w w  and 
0 > −










C n n n + = .  
Differently from monopoly unions model with linear cost and demand functions where the collusive 
wage is higher (lower), and employment levels are lower (higher), than the separate setting if 
products are substitutes (complements),
4 the collusive agreement always determines a higher wage 
and lower employment. This is so because, with a convex cost function, the conventional 
substitutability (complementarity) among products does not necessarily imply the strategic 
complementarity (substitutability) between them. Since monopoly unions set wages for all the 
workers in the industry, they internalize both the effects of product differentiation on wages and 
employment levels, and the positive externalities created by an increase in wage rates when unions 
operate independently (Davidson, 1988; Horn and Wolinsky, 1988b). In case of individual wage 
setting, if the union in A fixes a higher wage at the plants within the country, employment in B 
increases: in fact,  0 < ∂ ∂ A A w n  and  0 > ∂ ∂ B A w n . This means that, in the labor market, workers 
in A compete against workers in B. A similar result holds for union B. Instead, in case of wage 
collusion,  0 < ∂ ∂
C
A w n  and  0 < ∂ ∂
C
B w n : employment in each country depends negatively on 
the coordinated wage demand; competition among workers in the labor market disappears.  
Depending on the wage setting, the relative unions’ payoffs are different. Transnational 





S C Ω + Ω = Ω ≥ Ω , that is, if the overall union utility under 
collusion is higher than the sum of the national union utilities under separate setting. Payoffs’ 
comparison leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: The separate wage setting is Pareto-dominated by the collusive outcome if 
ϕ ϕ γ ϖ γ τ τ 4 ) 2 ( − + = ≤
∗ . 
 
Therefore, whenever coordination costs are below the threshold, unions face a Prisoner’s Dilemma: 
national unions have incentives to coordinate wage demands only if transaction costs, affected both 
by the minimum wage level and the degree of product differentiation, are not excessively high. 
Further analytical inspection yields to the following result. 
 
Corollary 1: An increase in the minimum wage and the degree of product differentiation lower the 
transaction costs’ threshold for union coordination: formally,  0 < ∂ ∂
∗ ϖ τ   and  0 > ∂ ∂
∗ c τ  
) 1 , 1 ( ) , 0 ( − ∈ ∧ ∞ ∈ ∀ c ϖ .  
Proof: see the Appendix.  
 
For low values of the minimum wage, the costs’ threshold for union cooperation tends to be high, 
approaching infinity as long as  0 → ϖ . Intuitively, wage coordination seems to be more likely 
                                                 
4 Under the same assumptions on demand and cost function, these results also hold in a more general “right-to-manage” 
model, as Horn and Wolinsky (1988b) show. when ϖ  is small, because high coordination costs are necessary to prevent union collusion. Instead, 
product differentiation reduces the magnitude of the threshold value for collusion profitability: as 
long as products are more differentiated, the range where the collusive outcome Pareto-dominates 
the independent setting is smaller. The insight is that union collusion is easier and more 
advantageous when product are substitutes rather than complements. The next proposition supports 
this intuition. 
 
Proposition 2: If 
∗ ≤ τ τ , a decrease in transaction costs makes the incentives for collusion higher, 
with gains from coordination larger when products are substitutes.   
 
Proof: Differentiation of the union utility differential 
S C Ω − Ω  with respect to coordination costs 
yields  0 ) ( 4 ) (
2 2 < + − = ∂ Ω − Ω ∂ τ γ τ a
S C . Further differentiation with respect to c leads to 
0 ) ( 2 ) (
3 2 2 > + = ∂ ∂ Ω − Ω ∂ τ γ τ a c
S C . For transaction costs sufficiently low, unions always 
find profitable wage coordination, whatever is the degree of product differentiation. Even if a 
reduction in transaction costs leads to a lower wage rate, gains in employment more than offset this 
loss. However, unions tend to perform better as long as the more products are similar.   
 
Thus, incentives for trans-national coordination exist, but the findings show that a classical 
Prisoner’s Dilemma exemplifies unions’ position respect to collusion. The next section investigates 
when collusion arises, and conditions for its sustainability as equilibrium of the unions’ game. 
 
3 The sustainability of trans-national union cooperation  
 
Collusion could be implemented in an infinitely repeated two-stage game. With four players, the set 
of possible strategy combinations is large. For the paper’s purposes, a simplifying assumption 
needs: firms have not the possibility to collude and always act as Cournot competitors. In a repeated 
framework, this is a strong assumption because also firms have incentives to collude. This work 
retains it to isolate the effects of unions’ coordinated wage demands. However, this hypothesis 
could be also seen as if there is an effective Antitrust Authority watching over the product market.  
Starting from a situation where unions demand a coordinated wage, each of them will capture an 
instantaneous utility gain by unilaterally deviating from the collusive agreement. Deviation implies 
a reduction in wage levels inducing the firms to relocate part of their productive activities in the 
country which union makes concessions. By assumption, when one union breaks the collusive 
agreement, in the subsequent period both unions come back to a national autonomous wage setting. 
Such a situation reflects that unions adopt a trigger strategy. Collusion can be sustained only if 
some realistic threats back it, such that the one-period gain from cheating will be lower than the 
discounted expected value from punishment, that is, the reversion to a separate setting. It is also 
assumed that the discount factor is identical for both unions. Collusion is sustainable in a repeated 
framework if  
 
) ( ) (
S D C D Ω − Ω Ω − Ω ≥ δ , 
 
where 
C Ω  is the utility level obtained with collusion, 
D Ω  is the utility level deriving from the one-
period defection
5 and 
S Ω  the utility derived from punishment. The right-hand side of the 
expression above is the discount factor threshold for sustainability of union collusion. This 
condition implies that unions will implicitly collude as long as they do not discount too much 
                                                 
5 If, for example, the cheating union is Union in country A, the maximization problem characterized as follows 
) , ( ) ( max arg
C
B A A A
A w
A w w n w w τ ϖ − − = . Further substitution of the optimal wage level under deviation into union 
utility expressions yields the utility from deviation, 
D
A Ω . future, and the immediate gains from unilateral deviation are low. Insertion of the relevant payoffs 
into the discount factor expression yields to  
 
) , , ( c τ ϖ δ δ ≥ .                 ( 9 )  
 
Given the complexity of the expression for the discount factor threshold, the discussion on the role 
played by transaction costs in the sustainability of collusion uses analytical tools and numerical 
simulations. Corollary 1 shows that an increase in the value of ϖ  lowers the threshold for the 
coordination costs and product differentiation further reduces the critical level of τ  which makes 
collusion profitable. Figure 1 depicts the discount factor threshold as a function of the transaction 
costs for given levels of minimum wages and product differentiation. Differentiation of (9) respect 
to transaction costs yields 
2 2 2 ) ( ) 2 ( ∆ Ν + + = ∂ ∂ ϕ γ τ δ c , where  ) , , ( c τ ϖ Ν = Ν  and 
) , , ( c τ ϖ ∆ = ∆ . The sign of this derivative depends on the sign of the numerator. Numerical 
simulations show that  0 ≥ ∂ ∂ τ δ   if 517 . ≈ ≥
∗ ϖ ϖ   when  c is close to 1 (substitutes), while 
174 . ≈ ≥
∗ ϖ ϖ  when c is close to -1 (complements). For 
∗ < ϖ ϖ , the discount factor threshold 
presents a U shaped relation: as long as coordination costs increase, it initially decreases and then 
remains at a low value of τ  within a certain range (wider in the case of substitutes). When 
coordination costs approach the upper limit 
∗ τ , the threshold of δ   drastically increases, and 
transnational coordination becomes prohibitively sustainable.  
This could be explained by the fact that, for given levels of product differentiation, combinations of 
low levels of  ϖ  and τ  make the losses of unilateral deviation from the collusive agreement 
relatively high for unions. Moreover, even if the value  of 
∗ τ  is lower in the presence of 
complement goods, for small values of ϖ  the level of the discount factor threshold may be lower 
respect to substitute goods, as Figure 1 shows (left side). In other words,  there are parameters’ 
combinations such that the wage differential’s impact from deviation on unions’ welfare when 
goods are complements is smaller than respect to substitute goods. However, as long ϖ  increases, 
gains from unilateral deviation in terms of wages in the presence of substitute goods are sufficiently 
small, and the long-run punishment is quite harsh, to make deviation not profitable. Instead, for 
∗ ≥ ϖ ϖ , a reduction in coordination costs for unions unambiguously reduces the discount factor 
threshold, making collusion more sustainable. Nonetheless, it should be noted that for 
∗ ≥ ϖ ϖ , an 
increase in ϖ  implies an increase in the level of the discount factor threshold: if the minimum wage 
level is relatively high, the utility loss faced by unions following unilateral deviation in coordinated 
wage demands turns out to be sensibly low. However, even if at low values of transaction costs 
0 ≤ ∂ ∂ τ δ  for 
∗ < ϖ ϖ , the discount factor threshold is lower respect to 
∗ ≥ ϖ ϖ .
6 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between the discount factor threshold and coordination  costs. 
Graphs are depicted for  01 . = ϖ , 04 . = ϖ 5 . = ϖ , and  99 . = c (red line), and  99 . − = c (blue line). 
 
                                                 
6 The threshold for the discount factor evaluated at  ) 1 , 1 ( 4469 . ) , 0 ( − ∈ ∀ ≈ =
∗ c ϖ τ δ . Finally, in the absence of coordination costs, it can be shown that the discount factor threshold takes 
values in the range  ) 2 1 , 4 1 ( 0 ∈ = τ δ  for  ) 1 , 1 ( ) , 0 ( − ∈ ∧ ∞ ∈ c ϖ , approaching its upper limit for 
∞ → ϖ . 
The above results complement those obtained in the intra-industry trade literature. Strozzi (2007, 
2008), extending the analysis of Straume (2002), finds that whit segmented markets and zero 
transaction costs between unions, the sustainability of implicit collusion depends both on trade 
barriers and the degree of substitutability among goods. If trade costs are relatively low, further 
trade liberalization makes to deviate an increasingly attractive option for unions, and deviation is 
comparatively more beneficial from the unions’ point of view the more differentiated goods are. 
Instead, when intra-industry trade occurs, but trade barriers are relatively high, a reduction in trade 
costs does not affect the sustainability of tacit collusion, which is easier the less similar are goods. 
In this case, the discount factor threshold ranges from  2 1 = δ  (almost independent goods) to 
17 9 = δ  (perfect substitutes), representing the lowest threshold values for implicit collusion. 
The fact that unions’ transnational agreements related to MNEs activities in the EU are growing in 
recent years may lead to think that coordination costs for union activities are falling. This suggests 
that labor markets’ integration is increasing. The findings here may shed light on the fact that wage 
coordination emerges as a gradually viable option for unions operating in MNEs. 
 
4 Union coordination and welfare  
 
As previously seen, if union collusion could be implemented, a transnational agreement improves 
workers’ conditions because their welfare share is higher in case of wage coordination respect to a 
separate setting. Now, a question arises: is union collusion always an undesirable outcome from the 
social view point? To answer this question is noteworthy for its redistributive implications. The sum 






i iq p U GW Ω + Ω + Π + − = ∑ ∑    j i 1,2 j i ≠ = , .      ( 1 0 )  
 
The minimum wage level could be used as an instrument by the “EU Commission” at central level 
to prevent wage coordination. An increase in ϖ  lowers the threshold for unions to coordinate their 
activities, making collusion less likely. Nevertheless, two observations need. First, such 
intervention has the cost of lowering the welfare level: in fact,  0 < ∂ ∂ ϖ
S GW  in the relevant  
) , ( c ϖ -space (see Appendix). This is so because an increase in ϖ  has a pass-through effect on 
higher prices and consequently in a consumer surplus’ fall, which is not compensated by other 
welfare components. Second, if union collusion arises as equilibrium, for a given level of 
transaction costs in the economy a change in ϖ  to avoid it not necessarily implies that 
C S GW GW > . Suppose that the minimum wage in the economy is equal to ϖ  and the 
coordination cost for unions equals the threshold,  ) , ( c ϖ τ τ
∗ = . An “EU Commission” intervention 
that increases the minimum wage to  ε ϖ ϖ + = '  implies that  ) , ' ( c ϖ τ τ
∗ > , preventing collusion. 
However, depending on the magnitude of ε , it could be that for some combinations of  ) , ' ( c ϖ , 
) ' ( ) , ( ϖ ϖ τ
S C GW GW < , while for other parameters’ configuration  ) ' ( ) , ( ϖ ϖ τ
S C GW GW > , as 
Figure 2 shows. These findings allow to establish the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: In the presence of  productive activities spread across countries, for a given level of 
transaction costs in the labor market, an increase in the minimum wage level may lead to a Pareto-
superior outcome from a social point of view the transnational wage coordination with respect to 
separate national wage settings.   
 Figure 2: Global Welfare in the  ) , ( c ϖ -space: Black and white refers to  ) ' (ϖ
S GW , color to ) , ( ϖ τ
C GW . 




Separate settings at low values of ϖ  ensure the highest social welfare levels, but this is exactly the 
case where a collusive agreement by unions is likely to arise as equilibrium. To obtain Pareto 
improvements in such a situation, the only way seems to be a political solution: unions may 
renounce to coordinate wage demands in favor of national government interventions adopting 




This work analyzes unions’ cross borders wage coordination in a context of international production 
within an integrated economy, and the consequences on social welfare. It presents a two-stage game 
model of international duopoly with differentiated products to investigate unions’ position toward 
wage coordination. In the presence of coordination costs (a measure of the labor market 
integration), unions may face a Prisoner’s Dilemma: below a threshold value, the collusive outcome 
Pareto-dominates the separate wage setting. Hence, incentives for national unions to coordinate 
wage demands exist. In a repeated framework, the transaction cost level, the minimum wage and the 
degree of product differentiation, are all element affecting union collusion.  
From the welfare analysis, some policy insights follow. A transnational agreement between unions 
improves workers’ conditions: unions are able to capture a higher share of welfare. An increase in 
the minimum wage lowers the threshold for coordination costs, making gains from cooperation 
smaller. This induces unions to individual wage setting, and the collusive outcome is less likely to 
arise. The implication of this policy is that, as long as the minimum wage increases, the social 
welfare decreases; it may occur that in some cases welfare under coordinated wage demands is 
higher than under separate settings. Pareto improvements could be obtained through a political 
solution: unions may give up coordinated wage demands in favor of subsequent national 
governments’ redistributive policy. 
These findings stand on peculiar hypothesis related to functional forms, monopoly unions and 
symmetry in unions’ preferences. A more general bargaining framework, as well as asymmetries in 
preferences over wages and employment, represent further extensions that could change the results. 
Moreover, if union collusion occurs as equilibrium, a deeper analysis needs to determine the public 











■ Global equilibrium expressions of the relevant variables in the two different wage settings follow. 
 
□ Separate wage setting (S). Equilibrium employment level, total union utility, total profits, consumers’ surplus and 
global welfare in S are given by 
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□ Coordinated wage setting (C). Equilibrium employment, total union utility, total profits, consumers’ surplus and 
global welfare in C are given by 
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■ Proof of Corollary 1 follows. 
 
Proof. The expression for the derivative of the threshold for transaction costs 
∗ τ  with respect to the minimum wage is 
given by  
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while the expression for the derivative of the threshold for transaction costs with respect to the degree of product 
differentiation is given by  
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The sign of these derivatives depends on the sign of the numerators of the relative expressions. Given the analytical 
complexity, their behavior is plotted in  Figure 3) on the right), where it is shown that num  0 < ∂ ∂
∗ ϖ τ ( left), and 
num  0 > ∂ ∂
∗ c τ  in the relevant range of analysis  ) 1 , 1 ( ) , 0 ( − ∈ ∧ ∞ ∈ c ϖ .   
 
 
Figure 3: Numerator functions of the partial derivatives  ϖ τ ∂ ∂
∗ (left) and  c ∂ ∂
∗ τ  (right)  in the  ) , ( c ϖ -space 
 
 Figure 4: Numerator function of the partial derivative  ϖ ∂ ∂
S GW  in the  ) , ( c ϖ -space 
for  1 = a  (left) and  10 = a  (right)   
 
 
■ Sign of the derivative of global welfare with respect to minimum wage. 
 
The derivative of global welfare in the separate wage setting respect to the minimum wage is given by 
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The sign of this derivative depends on the sign of the numerator. Since the analytical expression is not easy to be 
interpreted, the behavior of the numerator function is plotted in Figure 4 which shows that it is negative, approaching in 
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